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Ohio Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction
Ovid C. Lewis*
INTRODUCTION
This article essentially provides information concerning the operation
of the Ohio Supreme Court' With full realization of the divers infer-
ences which may be drawn from the statistics reported, I have reached
some conclusions and made a few suggestions. The reader is provided
with much of the basic research accomplished' and may differ from the
conclusions and suggestions of the author. Moreover, I am aware of the
necessarily subjective nature of any categorization of the significance at-
tributed to a particular case. However, the statistics appear to support
the assignment made to my tri-partite classification: high, moderate, low.3
It is relevant that the categorization of the cases was accomplished prior
to the compilation of data. Thus, I cannot be accused of making an ex
post facto classification to buttress my ultimate conclusions.
* The author (LL.M., Columbia University) is an Assistant Professor of Law at Western
Reserve University.
The author wishes to express his sincere appreciation to John R. Ferguson for his in-
valuable and diligent assistance at every stage of preparation of this article and to Michael F.
Grdina, who efficiently performed the tedious task of research and collation.
1. The approach is general and statistical. For an excellent analysis of the constitutiona.l
and statutory appellate jurisdiction provisions in Ohio, the reader is referred to Skeel, Some
Aspects of Appellate Procedure in Ohio, 12 W. Rs. L. REV. 645 (1961).
Ohio has a judicial council responsible for compiling data concerning the state's judicial
system. "There shall be a judicial council of sixteen members for the continuous study of the
organization, rules, and method of procedure and practice of the administrative agencies and of
the judicial system of the state, the work accomplished, and the results produced by those
agencies, and by the judicial system and its various parts ...." OHIo REV. CODE § 105.51
(Supp. 1962).
However, the statistical data reported concerning the operation and functioning of the
Ohio judicial system is meager. See the REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF OKIO
(1951-1961).
2. See charts I-XIX.
3. Basically, the significance was arrived at by evaluating the effect of a case on legal prece-
dent, the number of persons affected by the decision and the propagated rule, and the nature
of the interest involved. Thus, even though the lower court was clearly wrong and the su--
preme court reversed, if the effect of the case was merely to correct the equities in a specific
case, the significance would be limited. This is not to say that such a case should not be
reviewed. In emphasizing the general importance of a case the criteria resemble those sug-
gested by Justice Harlan regarding federal certiorari practice. "The cornerstone of a petition
for certiorari in a federal case is a showing that the question sought to be reviewed is one of
general importance. Review by certiorari is in the interest of the law, its appropriate exposi-
tion and enforcement, not in the mere interest of the litigants." (Quoting Chief Justice
Hughes, S. Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 39). Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 RECORD
OF N.Y.CB.A. 541, 551 (1958).
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The material here developed does not encompass the history of Ohio
appellate procedure.4 Instead I deal with the extant system, its problems,
and possible solutions.
The crux issue in appellate review is simply stated: Is the case a
proper one for review? The quaere is not so easily answered. Certain
considerations undoubtedly are involved. On the one hand, is the case
forensically unique or novel? Was justice meted out below? Did the
lower court err? Will review and reversal deter proliferation of errors in
lower courts? Will review and decision provide authoritative guidance
to a developing area of the law? Will the decision affect a substantial
segment of the population?5 On the other hand, the factor inhibiting
appellate review is the incubus of crowded appellate dockets.' With the
press of time, the court should wisely utilize its review power by hearing
only the proper cases. However, state constitutional and statutory pro-
visions compelling the court to exercise broad appellate review frustrate
achievement of an optimal appellate system.7
With the above considerations in mind, the cases decided by the
Ohio Supreme Court during the 1962 term were analyzed. For purposes
of comparison a brief analysis of the work of the New Jersey Supreme
Court during the 1960-1961 term is included. The New Jersey judicial
system was selected because of its reputation for dispensing efficient and
effective justice. Sheldon D. Elliott, Director of the Institute of Judicial
Administration, eulogizes the new judicial system in New Jersey:8
Has the new system worked? The answer is a definite and overwhelm-
ing "Yes." Pre-existing accumulated backlogs of untried cases have been
disposed of, and current cases are brought to trial within a few months
instead of years. Appeals are heard and decided promptly .... In
short, "Jersey justice," no longer a term of opprobrium, has become
an enviable synonym for modern and efficient judicial administration.9
A specific purpose of this project concerned the feasibility of adoption
in state judicial systems of a procedure analogous to United States Su-
4. See Skeel, Constitutional History of Ohio Appellate Courts, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 323
(1957).
5. See POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASEs 378-79 (1941); Parker, Improv-
ing Appellate Methods, 25 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1950); Traynor, Some Open Questions on the
Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 211 (1957).
6. Compare STATE OF NEW YORK, THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT
159, table 1 (1960), with STATE OF NEW YORK, THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, SIXTH AN-
NUAL REPORT 206, table 1 (1961), and STATE OF NEw YORK, THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,
SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 188, table 1 (1962).
7. This is one of the problems in the New York appellate structure. The court of appeals
must exercise broad mandatory appellate jurisdiction. N.Y. CoNsT. art. 6 § 3. See also N.Y.
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT § 5601 (effective September 1, 1963).
8. The present court structure in New Jersey was established on September 15, 1948, when
the Judicial Article of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 became effective.
9. ELLIOTT, IMPROVING OUR COURTS 14 (1959).
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preme Court Rule 20.10 This rule permits the Court to certify for hear-
ing a case pending in the court of appeals. Similar procedures exist in
New Jersey and California. I believe the New Jersey experience exem-
plifies the desirability of adopting a similar method of review in Ohio.
APPELLATE REVIEW IN THE OHIO SUPREME COURT -
1962 TERM
For the purposes of this study, the reader should be apprised gen-
erally of the appellate structure in Ohio. The relationship between the
courts is reflected in chart one."' At the appellate apex stands the
supreme court.'" Mandatory appeals, i.e., appeals as of right, are taken to
the supreme court from the determinations of the Public Utilities Com-
mission, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the courts of appeals.'3 These
cases comprised 56.7 per cent of the total number of cases heard during
the 1962 term. Permissive appeals, i.e., appeals allowed pursuant to a
motion to certify, are taken only from the courts of appeals.'4 These
cases comprised 18.3 per cent of those heard. Cases are also reviewed by
certification "whenever the judges of a court of appeals find that a judgment
upon which they have agreed is in conflict with a judgment pronounced
upon the same question by any other court of appeals . . .. "" In addi-
tion, the supreme court exercises original jurisdiction in two instances:
(1) disciplinary proceedings concerning attorneys," and (2) applica-
tions for issuance of the extraordinary writs of quo warranto, mandamus,
habeas corpus, prohibition, and procedendo.Y These original jurisdiction
cases comprised 23.7 per cent of the total cases heard.'"
For the jurisdiction of the court of appeals and court of common
pleas, the reader is referred to chart two.
10. 28 U.S.C. 5 1254 (1948):
"Courts of appeals; certiorari; appeal; certified questions.
"Cases in the courts of appeal may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following
methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal
case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree . (Emphasis added.)
11. See Skeel, supra note 1.
12. See chart II. The Ohio Constitution authorizes the appointment of a commission to
serve for specified periods. OHto CONST. art. IV, § 22. This commission has the same
power and jurisdiction as the supreme court, and cases decided by the commission are not
appealable to the supreme court. Maud v. Maud, 34 Ohio S. 540 (1878).
13. See chart M. Note that an appeal may also lie from the Board of Tax Appeals to the
court of appeals.
14. See chart II. For purposes of this study, all motions for leave to appeal have been
grouped with motions to certify.
15. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6.
16. OmIo REV. CODE § 4705.02. But see OHIO Sup. CT. R. XXVII.
17. OHIo CoNsT. art. IV, § 2.
18. See chart X.
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Chart three sets forth the statutory authorization for appellate review,
the court or agency to which the review is taken, and the type of review
afforded for the probate court, juvenile court, municipal court, mayor's
court, county count, police court, state agencies, Department of Taxation,
Industrial Commission, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, Super-
intendent of Banks, Superintendent of Building and Loan, and local
boards. By reading charts two and three in conjunction with chart one,
a broad picture of the appellate structure in Ohio is readily discernible.
Chart four deals only with cases coming to the supreme court from
the courts of appeals. The tribunal antecedent to the court of appeals is
indicated in the left column. The cases are divided into three categories:
mandatory appeals, permissive appeals, and certification cases. It is telling
that 72.8 per cent of the mandatory appeals are of low significance vis-i-
vis only 23.5 per cent of the permissive appeals. Also, 82.5 per cent of
the mandatory appeals are memorandum or per curiam decisions, while
only 17.6 per cent of the permissive appeals are thus decided.
Chart five indicates the analogous figures for appeals from the Board
of Tax Appeals: 52.0 per cent low significance and 48.0 per cent mem-
orandum or per curiam decisions.
Chart six indicates the figures for appeals from the Public Utilities
Commission: 66.6 per cent low significance and 66.6 per cent memoran-
dum or per curiam decisions.
The correlation between cases of low significance and the use of
memorandum or per curiam opinions is not surprising. When a case
falls dearly within the ambit of an existing legal precept, there is no
utility in a full-dress opinion merely reiterating traditional legal doctrine.
These foredoomed cases, ripe for memorandum disposition, are usually
found among the mandatory appeal cases. 9
In chart seven an attempt has been made to place each case into a con-
ventional legal pigeonhole. The chart manifests a striking asymmetry. Clus-
tered under the cases of low significance are the per curiam and memoran-
dum dispositions. Most of the memorandum dismissals are in the areas of
constitutional law, criminal law, and taxation. All but two of the in-
significant cases in these areas came to the court as a mandatory appeal.
Full-dress majority opinions, however, are found in the areas where the
cases are of moderate and high significance. As expected, those are gen-
19. Justice Cardozo's experience indicated that: "Of the cases that come before the court in
which I sit, a majority, I think, could not, with semblance of reason, be decided in any way
but one. The law and its application alike are plain. Such cases are predestined, so to speak,
to affirmance without opinion." CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 164(1921). During the 1960 term the United States Supreme Court utilized the device of an
anonymous opinion in more than 50% of its decisions. For a discussion of the United States
Supreme Court's use of per curiam opinions see The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 80, 92 (1961), and articles cited at 92 n.13.
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eraly the cases reaching the court via a motion to certify. This is also true
of cases sent to the court on certification by the court of appeals.
Chart eight contrasts mandatory and permissive appeals, cases certified
by the court of appeals, and original jurisdiction cases. The rate of re-
versal in each appellate category is instructive. Mandatory appeals:
16.4 per cent. Cases certified by the court of appeals: 44.4 per cent.
Permissive appeals: 73.6 per cent. These statistics point out that even
if the lower court is dearly correct in its judgment, the supreme court
must needlessly review where appeal is mandatory. The result is a re-
versal per curiam or a memorandum dismissal of the appeal.
Chart eight also indicates the action taken by the court in disciplinary
proceedings directed against a member of the bar and in disposing of
extraordinary writs. In addition, the relative frequency of each of fifteen
classes of dispositions is given.
Chart nine lists the members of the supreme court, the number of
opinions written per judge, and related information. The number of
judges temporarily assigned to the supreme court is striking. More than
15 per cent of the majority opinions were authored by visiting judges.
It is possible that the assignment of so many judges impairs predictability
since the study of an individual judge's opinions will demonstrate his
method of deciding a case and his values. A fortiori, the aggregate of
opinions
cumulate to show ways of looking at things, ways of sizing things up,
ways of handling authorities, [and] . . . attitudes in one area of life-
conflict and another .... For one must not forget that a particular
bench tends strongly to develop a characteristic going tradition not only
of ways of work but of outlook, and of working attitudes of one judge
toward another.2 °
The brevity of the majority opinions (average length 3.64 pages) is
another factor suggesting the cases decided are of limited significance.
If a court is burdened with frivolous appeals, the treatment of more sig-
nificant cases suffers as well.
On thirty-six occasions judges dissented without opinion. This is per-
haps due to the necessity of examining cases on mandatory appeal where
guidance is not important for the public, yet the fireside equities generate
divergent conclusions. But where the case is significant, the dissenting
judge will ordinarily write an opinion to force or compel "fall publicity,
[ride] ... herd on the majority, and [help] ... to keep constant the ob-
servance of that law."'"
20. LLWEwLLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADmoN: DEcIING APPEA s 34 (1960).
21. Id. at 26. Justice Traynor has commented extensively on the office of the dissenting
opinion. "If a judge merely deems his own view preferable, and the establishment of some
rule counts more than the rule itself, he should at most record his dissent in two words or
preferably keep his silence. If he is convinced that the majority has so misapplied settled law
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Chart ten differentiates between per curiam and ordinary disposition
of extraordinary writs. Most of these writs were classified as low in sig-
nificance. Most were summarily decided.
From the data contained in charts one through twelve, the picture
emerges of a court handling too many cases of low significance, prima-
rily reaching the court via mandatory appeal. To cope with this problem
the court resorts to per curiam decisions, generally affirming the decision
below, or dismissing the appeal. This latter device, "appeal as of right
herein is dismissed for the reason that no debatable constitutional ques-
tion is involved," was used in fifty-nine cases in the 1962 term. Although
the court is able to avoid a hearing on a frivolous mandatory appeal, it
must nonetheless examine the papers to see if there might be merit to the
case.
Dean Pound incisively notes:
[O]ur appellate courts have been burdened with another type of appeal
which has been and still is a source of waste of judicial power, waste
of public time, and needless expense to litigants, namely, futile appeals
raising questions which have been long or well settled but are earnestly
argued, often in entire good faith by those who raise them. There is
more than one cause of these futile appeals. They cannot be wholly cut
off. Often until the cause is argued it is difficult to distinguish them.22
It should be a matter of concern to every member of the bar when his
brethren raise constitutional questions with the "substance of a starving
pigeon's shadow" to obtain the right of appeal to the supreme court. Each
such appeal detracts from the time available to consider, ponder, and de-
cide the substantially significant cases. 3
or so erroneously devised a new rule as to foster a malignant growth of the law, he should at
least record his dissent. Should he decide to set forth his reasons, he should do so with pain-
staking care. Above all, he should keep his opinion impersonal. No conscientious judge
will undertake a dissent without first asking himself the searching question whether it is
likely to serve the law by extracting from the shadows the problems left unstated and the
theories that should eventually control. Reference to the majority opinion should be kept at
a minimum, unless it serves as a time-saving device to indicate the relevant defects and gaps
that compel the rationale of the dissent.
"Paradoxically the well-reasoned dissent, aimed at winning the day in the future, enhances
the present certainty of the majority opinion, now imbedded in the concrete of resistance to
the published arguments that beat against it. For that very reason the thoughtful dissident
does not find it easy to set forth his dissent." Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of
State Appellate Court, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 218 (1957).
Dillard argues cogently that the dissenting "opinion may be required, in a state court
jurisdiction to provide a balanced view of a case and even the means for approaching an
understanding of it." Dillard, Dissent from Llewellyn on Dissent, 1962 WASH. U.LQ. 53, 63.
22. PouND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CAsES 379 (1941).
23. In connection with groundless petitions for certiorari, Justice Harlan proposes that "the
best hope for safeguarding the future lies in the Bar taking hold of the situation by discourag-
ing abuses of the certiorari procedure, whether born of ignorance of the nature of the process
or of lack of responsible abstention on the part of lawyers in seeking to bring 'uncertworthy'
cases to the Court. Looking ahead, it is hard to think of any greater contribution that the Bar
could make to the effective functioning of the Court." Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 REC-
ORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 541, 561 (1958).
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The supreme court docket is overcrowded because of the quantity of
mandatory appeals. This is one possible reason why the majority opin-
ions are so brief. Do these opinions, written under the pressure of a
crowded appellate docket, provide adequate guides for lawyers and so-
ciety? The author, having enjoyed the privilege of working as a judicial
clerk, knows something of the enormous amount of work that goes into
an adequate judicial opinion. The author of an opinion must rework his
solutions and formulations until they appear rational and harmonious
with the social matrix and demands of the time. Whatever solution is
arrived at, it must be posited on a solution for the situation-type of prob-
lem the particular conflict presents, both in terms of extrapolation from
the past and into the future.24 The solutions must be guides to action.
They must embody rules of reason which manifest the situation-type and
scope of applicability. And there must, of course, be stability and pre-
dictability. There is always the further requirement that like cases be
treated alike, and that laymen's reasonable expectations be fulfilled. But
law must change with the demands of the times. To use Ehrlich's over-
worked phrase, it must be "living law."
To decide cases properly thus requires time. And the cases on which
the court expends this effort in building a valuable legal edifice should
be the significant cases.
APPELLATE REVIEW IN THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT -
1961-1962 TERN 2 1
In New Jersey the trial court is in most instances either a county
court or superior court, law or chancery division. The appellate division
of the superior court has broad mandatory appellate jurisdiction over
24. This Professor Llewellyn styles "situation sense. "The wise place to search thoroughly
for what is the right and fair solution is the recurrent problem-situation of which the instant
case is typical. For in the first place this presses, this drives, toward formulating a solving
and guiding rule; and to address oneself to the rule side of the puzzle is of necessity both to
look back upon the heritage of doctrine and also to look forward into prospective conse-
quences and prospective further problems - and to account to each .... T]he immediate
equities fall into a wider, paler frame which renders it much easier both to feel and to see
how much and what parts of them are typical and so are proper shapers of policy, how much
and what part on the other hand is too individual for legal cognizance or appeals rather to
sentimentality than to the sensitivity and sense proper to a legal-governmental scheme."
LLEWELLYN, THE CoMMoN LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 44 (1960).
25. See charts XIII-XVIII. Most of the data contained in the charts is based on the cases
reported in volumes thirty-three through thirty-six of the New Jersey Reports. Where the
1961 Report of the Administrative Director of the Courts of New Jersey contained relevant
data, it was the source cited rather than the reports. Since the period covered in volumes
thirty-five and thirty-six of the New Jersey Reports is somewhat longer than that of the Report
of the Administrative Director of the Courts, there is no numerical correlation between the
two sets of data.
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cases brought in the trial courts.2" The appellate jurisdiction of the su-
preme court is limited as far as mandatory jurisdiction goes, but broad
in terms of permissive jurisdiction. Appeals may be taken to the supreme
court:
(a) In causes determined by the Appellate Division of the Superior
Court involving a question arising under the Constitution of the United
States or this State;
(b) In causes where there is a dissent in the Appellate Division of
the Superior Court;
(c) In capital causes;
(d) On certification by the Supreme Court to the Superior Court
and, where provided by rules of the Supreme Court, to the County
Courts and the inferior courts; and(e) In such causes as may be provided by law.27
The New Jersey Supreme Court not only has broad discretionary power
in determining the cases it will hear, but it is vested with rule making
power in the area of practice and procedure. The New Jersey Constitu-
tion of 1947 provides: "The Supreme Court shall make rules governing
the administration of all courts in the state and, subject to law, the prac-
tice and procedure in all such courts."28  At its first meeting in 1947,
the new supreme court agreed to use the federal rules as a model for the
New Jersey rules. This decision was made in light of the comprehensive
scope of the federal rules and their use and interpretation for a decade.
26. N.J. RULEs 2:2-1:
"Appeals in all causes may be taken to [the appellate division~from final judgments:
(a) In causes determined by the trial divisions of this court,
(b) In causes determined by the county courts;
(c) In causes civil determined by the county district courts;
(d) In causes determined by the juvenile and domestic relations courts, except bastardy
proceedings ....
(g) In such causes as may be provided by law."
27. See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (1947), implemented by N.J. RuLE 1:2-1.
28. N.J. CoNsT. art. VI, § 20. The phrase, "subject to law," was first construed in the
famous case of Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 73 A.2d 905, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877
(1950). Chief Justice Vanderbilt, writing for the majority, held that the phrase, "subject
to law" referred to substantive law, not legislation concerning practice and procedure. Thus,
the New Jersey Supreme Court is vested with power to make rules in four areas: (1) rules
governing the administration of all courts in the state; (2) rules in practice and procedure in
all courts, subject to substantive law; (3) rules governing the admission and practice of at-
torneys; (4) rules concerning practice and procedure in respect to former prerogative writs.
In Ohio, it was former Chief Justice Weygandt's opinion, in a letter to Judge Gilmore of
the Common Pleas Court of Preble County, that: "Under the Constitution of Ohio the Supreme
Court has no control over the rule-making power of other courts except through the usual
testing process of proceedings in error. You are therefore at liberty to promulgate your court
rules in the usual manner without first submitting them to this court for approval." 8 OHIO
BAR 447-48 (1935). Justice Weygandt relied on his opinion in Meyer v. Briosky, 129 Ohio
St. 371, 195 N.E. 702 (1935). The Meyer case was relied on in Brown v. Mossop, 139 Ohio
St. 24, 37 N.E.2d 598 (1941). It is debatable whether the Ohio Constitution required such
a limited interpretation. Judicial rule-making power is set forth in Omo REV. CODE §§
2503.36, 2505.45, 2501.08, 2101.04, and 2301.04. Section 2101.04 provides, inter alia:
"In order to maintain regularity and uniformity in the proceedings of all the probate courts,
the supreme court may alter and amend such rules and make other rules."
[Vol. 14:3
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As a result, on September 15, 1948, a new set of New Jersey rules, based
on the federal rules, became effective. Periodic revisions and amend-
ments were made to stabilize the rules and increase their utility. The
most recent general revision of the rules became effective on September
9, 1953, and by June of 1954, rule changes had become primarily techni-
cal.
To understand the rule-making power in New Jersey, the Ohio prac-
titioner should be aware of the function of the judicial conference.
There shall be a judicial conference to consider improvements of pro-
cedure in the courts, to consider and recommend legislation and to ex-
change ideas with respect to the improvement of the adminstration of
justice .... (d) the Supreme Court shall appoint such committees as
it shall deem necessary or desirable .... (g) the Administrative Di-
rector [of the courts] shall serve as secretary .. .?
The judicial conference holds two sessions annually, one in the spring
and one in the fall. Throughout the year, the Office of the Administra-
tive Director works closely with the various standing committees, espe-
cially the committee on the rules."° It assists in drafting proposed rules.
If the proposals of the judicial conference are substantive in nature, they
are put in bill form and referred to the legislature by the Administrative
Director.
Another important factor in the administration of the New Jersey
judicial system is the assignment judge."1 His duties include:
charging the grand jury, the assignment of cases in the Superior Court
and County Court in the county and.., the orderly administration of
civil and criminal justice in all courts within the county subject to the
direction in administrative matters of the Chief Justice.32
Ordinarily there is a high degree of rapport between the assignment judge
29. N.J. RULE 1:23-1. The New Jersey judicial conference is similar in conception to the
Ohio Judicial Council. See supra note 1. To date the statistical information available on the
work of the courts published by the council has been sparse.
30. The Administrative Director's Office essentially engages in collection and analysis of
court business, assignment of judges, calendar control, preparation of the budget for the courts,
supplying information, and publication of opinions. See McConnell, The Administrative Of-
fice ot the Courts of New Jersey, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 290 (1960).
31. For an interesting analysis see Del Tnfo, An Assignment judge, 15 RUTGERS L REv. 179
(1961). For the importance ascribed to the assignment judge by Justice Vanderbilt see Van-
derbilt, The Record of the New Jersey Court in the Seventh Year under the Constitution of
1947, 10 RUTGEmS L REv. 397, 400 (1955).
32. N.J. RULE 1:29-1. In Ohio, the chief justice of the supreme court may assign judges
of the courts of common pleas from one county to another when an unusual number of cases
have accumulated in a court of common pleas of a county. OHio REv. CODE S 2503.04.
The Code also provides for the selection of a chief justice of the courts of appeal. Ono
REV. CODE § 2501.03. The chief justice, upon request by the presiding judge of an appellate
district and upon being satisfied that the business of the district requires it, can assign judges
from other districts to the requesting district. OHo REv. CODE § 2501.14.
Each county having more than two judges of the court of common pleas has a chief justice.
The chief justice has the general superintendence of the business of the court and classifies
and distributes it. OHIo REV. CODE S 2301.04.
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and the chief justice. This might be due to the fact that the chief justice
personally appoints the assignment judges.
The unique feature of New Jersey appellate practice is expressed in
New Jersey Rule 1:10-1 "
33. The New Jersey rule is not unique in theory, but rather in its extensive use by the court.
N.J. RULE 1:10-1A provides: "Where an appeal is pending unheard in the Appellate Division
and all briefs have been filed any party thereto may serve and file with this court within 5
days of the filing of the last brief, a motion for certification."
28 U.S.C. § 1254 provides: "Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Su-
preme Court by the following methods:
(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party of any civil or criminal
case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree."
United States Supreme Court Rule 20 provides: "A writ of certiorari to review a case
pending in a court of appeals, before judgment is given in such court will be granted only
upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify the devia-
tion from normal appellate processes and to require immediate settlement by this court."
There is great similarity between the New Jersey certification rules and the federal rules
for certiorari. However, Chief Justice Vanderbilt warned that, "however closely the text of
our rules may resemble the language of Federal Rules, state precedents and the conditions
which uniquely affect our own system of courts will be more influential than the decisions of
federal tribunals. The landmarks developed by the United States Supreme Court in deter-
mining whether certiorari will be granted must, therefore, be used with great caution in de-
ciding whether certification should be requested by our own Supreme Court." SCHNrrZER,
THE NEW PRACTIcE 343-44 (1949).
Needless to say, this would be equally true in Ohio.
Rule 20 was used recently in Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (desegre-
gation case); United States v. Thomas, 361 U.S. 950 (1960); Aaron v. Cooper, 357 U.S. 566
(1958) (school integration plan); and Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) (jurisdic-
tion).
An Indiana provision provided: "Whenever in the opinion of the Supreme Court there
is a disparity between the number of the cases pending in the Appellate Court and the num-
ber pending in the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court may make an order stating the number
of cases that should be transferred from the appellate court to the Supreme Court, and the
clerk of said court shall thereupon transfer from the docket of the Supreme Court the re-
quired number of cases. In making such transfer, the clerk shall begin with the oldest un-
distributed case on the docket of the division of said appellate court, and shall take the required
number in their order on said docket." IND. STAT. ANN., tit. 4, § 218.
This provision was merely a makeweight for equalizing the workload of the Indiana Su-
preme Court and appellate courts. In that sense, it failed to further the decision of significant
cases by the supreme court. For a typical case see In re Barger's Estate, 114 Ind. App. 129,
51 N.E.2d 104 (1943). This provision was abrogated September 6, 1943, by Indiana Supreme
Court Rule 2-23.
The California Constitution of 1879, as amended November 8, 1949, art. VI, § 4d pro-
vides: "The Supreme Court may order any case in a district court of appeal transferred to it
for decision. An order under this section may be made before decision by the district court
of appeal or thereafter up to the time such decision becomes final ...."
This provision has not been implemented. Mr. Richard A. Frank, Deputy Director of the
Administrative Office of the Courts of California, informs me that the supreme court does
occasionally transfer a case under this provision when it determines that a case pending in a
district court of appeal is of general importance. Apparently several transfers to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court before decision in the court of appeals are made each year. No transfers
of this type appear in the California cases published in volumes fifty-six and fifty-seven of
California Reports 2d (cases decided May 29, 1961 - June 12, 1962). Of course, with its
highly flexible appellate system there is no necessity for transfer. See CAL. CONST.
art. VI, § 4. "For the most part [the California Supreme Court's] . . . selection is discretion-
ary. Even though it has constitutional appellate jurisdiction in probate matters, in all cases
in equity, and in all cases involving title to real property except such as arise in municipal
and justice courts, these are customarily transferred to the seven intermediate District Courts
of Appeal. Moreover, it is now the custom to transfer most petitions for writs of mandamus,
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Certification on Motion of the Court.
(a) Certification shall be allowed where the court of its own motion
certifies a cause or class of causes for appeal.
(b) All appeals taken in causes where the indictment is for murder
or any other capital offense are hereby certified directly to this court.
Certification by the court constitutes approximately 41 per cent of the
activity of the court, certification on petition 28 per cent, and mandatory
appeals (including automatic certification in capital case) 30 per cent. 4
In addition, there are dissenting opinions filed in 12 per cent of the cer-
tification cases as opposed to only 3 per cent filed in mandatory appeal
cases. 5  This dearly demonstrates that the issues involved in cases cer-
tified by the court are of significance to the community and troublesome
enough to present persuasive grounds for alternative decisions.
The cases where certification is granted by petition are equally sig-
nificant. But an additional problem arises where petitions for certifica-
tion are involved. What standards are to guide the petitioner in deciding
whether to apply for certification of a case? Where the petition is for
certification directly from the judgment of a trial court, the supreme court
suggests certification will be granted:
(a) Where a substantial question arises under the Constitution or a
statute of the United States or of this State, which is of general public
importance and which urgently requires adjudication by this court.
(b) Where questions of great public importance are involved which
urgently require prompt adjudication 36
Three additional grounds exist when the petition is for certification of
an appeal pending but unheard in the appellate division:
(1) Where the appeal presents a substantial question which has not
been, but should be settled by the court of last resort of this state;
(2) Where the appeal presents a substantial question the same as or
similar to a question presented on another appeal pending in this court;
(3) Where the appeal presents a question within the provisions of
Rule 1: 10-3.37
When a case meets the requirements of the above rules, it is a proper
prohibition, and certiorari to these courts. Conversely, the Supreme Court retains tax cases
and election matters of state-wide concern, and it exercises exclusive jurisdiction in the review
of automatic appeals in death penalty cases, Public Utilities Commission decisions, State Bar
recommendations, and over coram nobis applications when the criminal judgments were pre-
viously affirmed in the Supreme Court. Thus, almost all appeals are first decided in these
intermediate courts." Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts,
24 U. Cm. L REV. 211, 213 (1957). For background material regarding the California
transfer rules see Witkin, New California Rules on Appeal, 17 So. CAL. L. REv. 232, 235-38
(1944).
34. See chart XIV. Note the percentages for the 1961-1962 term in chart XV.
35. See chart XIV.
36. N.J. RuLE 1:10-3.
37. N.J. RULE 1:10-1. The language of these rules is derived from United States Supreme
Court Rule 19.
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case for appellate review by the highest state appellate tribunal. On this
point few would disagree. But the inevitable quaere, surely follows: Is
not the examination of each petition too time consuming? To date, it
has not been. This is partially due to the stringency of the standards pro-
pounded and the limitation of the brief on motion for certification to
three pages. 8 Another inhibiting factor is the low probability of suc-
ceeding on the motion. Only six cases brought to the supreme court by
a petition for certification prior to a hearing in the court of appeals were
decided between June 6, 1960, and February 26, 1962.
However, the court on its own motion certifies a significant number
of cases. These cases, in most instances, would ultimately reach the su-
preme court on appeal. The certification procedure obviates the need of
a time consuming intermediate hearing, decision, written opinion, and
further filing of briefs and records.
Where a party petitions for certification after judgment in the court
of appeals New Jersey Rule 1:10-2 applies:
Certification to the Appellate Division is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion, and will be allowed on final judgments only
where there are special and important reasons therefor. The following,
while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indi-
cate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) Where the Appellate Division has decided a question of sub-
stance not theretofore determined by a court of last resort of this State,
or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with applicable de-
cisions of such court.
(b) Where the decision under review is in conflict with any other
decision of the Appellate Division.
(c) Where the judges of the Appellate Division concur in result, but
are unable to agree upon a common ground of decision.
(d) Where the Appellate Division has decided an important question
of law which has not been, but should be settled by this court; or has so
far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings,
or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower tribunal as to call for
an exercise of this court's supervision.
(e) Where the Appellate Division has decided a question of sub-
stance relating to the construction or application of a statute of this State,
which has not been, but should be settled by this court.
Ohio has a high rate of dismissals of appeals for the failure of the
parties to present a debatable constitutional question. New Jersey has a
high denial rate for petitions for certification. 9 Ohio has an even higher
38. N.J. RULE 1:10-1A.
39. During the 1961-1962 term 70% of petitioner's motions for certification were denied.
This is far higher than in the early years of the last decade. See chart XV. During the period
of the study reflected in chart XIV, there was a fairly steady increase in the percentage of peti-
tions denied:
June 6, 1960-Aug. 6, 1960 62% denied.
Sept. 19, 1960-Nov. 21, 1960 67% denied.
Dec. 5, 1960-Feb. 27, 1961 68% denied.
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denial rate.40 In an effort to discover which grounds were most effective,
a representative sample was taken of sixty-two New Jersey petitions for
certification (all dealing with petitions after judgment in the court of ap-
peals). The grounds urged and decision of the supreme court on the
petitions are set forth in chart eighteen.41 Unfortunately, the results
were not very enlightening. Ground one was most frequently urged,
ground three was not urged at all. It might be inferred that those peti-
tions employing the shotgun approach, i.e., based on multiple grounds,
are frequently denied. This indicates a lack of meritorious application of
any one ground to the petitioner's case.
There are noticeable trends in New Jersey Supreme Court opinions.
The court writes fewer full opinions, relying more on per curiam. opin-
ions to dispose of foredoomed cases.42 Further, the decrease in dissenting
opinions48 probably represents Chief Justice Weintraub's ability to recon-
cile the views of the members of the court. The New Jersey Supreme
Court indeed manifests a "known bench, where the strain of the opinion
to be whole-group opinion (typically enough with the chief at work if
cleavage should threaten) climaxes the whole process of a group decid-
ing."4
4
March 6, 1961-May 23, 1961 74% denied.
June 5, 1961-July 28, 1961 56% denied.
Sept. 25, 1961-Nov. 20, 1961 75% denied.
Dec. 4, 1961-Feb. 26, 1962 90% denied.
The same problem exists in the federal system. During the 1961 term only 13.5% (89)
petitions for certiorari were granted. See The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARv. L REv.
75, 81 (1962). See also supra note 3.
40. For 1960 the denial rate was 80.7%. See chart XIX.
41. See chart XVIII. In New Jersey a petition is granted on the affirmative vote of three or
more justices. N.J. RULE 1:10-13. There is ordinarily no oral argument, but it may be
requested in a complex case. N.J. RULE 1:10-1A. See WALTZzIGER, 1 N.J. PRACICE
SERES 133 (1954).
42. See chart XV. See also supra note 21. There are four memorandum opinions based on
the "opinion below" in volume thirty-five of New Jersey Reports. In one such opinion, the
well-reasoned opinion below is set forth in toto. Western Elec. Co. v. Hussey, 35 N.J. 250,
172 A.2d 645 (1961). In the other three cases the approximate language of the supreme
court reads: "The judgment is affirmed for the reasons expressed in the opinion of Judge X
in the Appellate Division." Dixon v. Holley & Smith, 35 N.J. 594, 174 A.2d 477 (1961);
Shaw v. Mayor & Twp. Comm., 35 N.J. 595, 174 A.2d 474 (1961); and Green v. Bell Clean-
ers, 35 N.J. 596, 174 A.2d 474 (1961). Both practices are recommended by Professor
Llewellyn. On the use of the opinion below see, LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADI-
TiON: DEcIDING APPEALS 318-19 (1960). On the use of a memorandum opinion see LLEw-
ELLYN, op. cit. supra at 312 where he suggests the following language: "The case falls within
the reason of X v. Y," instead of "affirmed on the authority of X v. Y."
43. See chart XV.
44. LLE ELLYN, op. cit. supra note 42, at 224. The New Jersey judicial system today substan-
tially achieves the goals Justice Weintraub articulated in 1958: "The law must be stable so that
the citizen may act with assurance. Yet the law may not be static. It must move with events,
else it will petrify and burden the society it is meant to serve.
"[C]onsideration should be given to the extent of reasonable reliance by the public upon
prior decisions because the unfairness to those who relied may outweigh the benefit of the
change, especiaUy if there is also present an overriding social need for stability. Thus a court
should be loathe to reconsider, for example the basic law of real property. On the other
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The statistical picture emerges of a court selecting the cases it feels
are significant or decided wrongly below, with a strong chief justice who
reconciles conflicts with a concomitant high degree of unanimity, and a
judicious use of per curiam opinions, with time to adequately research
and write opinions in the significant cases.4"
New Jersey has achieved a high degree of flexibility and efficiency
in the operation of its courts, thanks to the combined efforts of the su-
preme court, judicial conference, administrative office, and assignment
judges.46
In view of the increases in work load and litigation in the trial and
intermediate appellate courts, it is anomalous to discover that the New
Jersey Supreme Court today disposes of less cases than it did ten years
ago.47 The judges write fewer opinions, the average is fourteen a judge.48
The average length of an opinion is ten pages (average length of major-
ity opinion in Ohio: 3.64 pages). The opinions are generally well writ-
ten and admirably satisfy all the requirements previously discussed. This
in part may be attributed to the power of selectivity over cases heard in
the supreme court.
Under the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, article 6, section 5, the
mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the court is limited; its permissive
jurisdiction broad. The committee on the judiciary reported to the con-
stitutional convention of 1947:
There was some difference of opinion as to whether the jurisdiction of
[the supreme court] should be selective and limited to important cases,
including constitutional questions and capital offenses, or whether it
should take appeals comprehensively as [did] . . . the court of errors
and appeals. It was feared by some that a restricted jurisdiction might
leave the justices idle, while others believed that a plenary calendar of
appeals might overburden them since approximation of future judicial
business is at best a prophecy, the committee decided to err on the side
of caution. By making the new supreme court's appellate jurisdiction
hand the element of reliance in the field of tort is small (failure to insure is about it) and
hence in that area there is more leeway for conciliation with common sense. So also the retro-
active impact of judicial legislation suggests a slow evolutionary accommodation. Dramatic
thrusts into new areas must be left to the legislature." Weintraub, Judicial Legislation, 81
N.J. L. J. 545, 549 (1958).
45. See the random sample of New Jersey Supreme Court opinions in Lewis, The Judicial
Process and Situational Sense (1962) (unpublished thesis in Columbia Law School Library).
46. This efficiency is practically a survival requirement. The Report of the Administrative
Office of the Courts for 1961 indicates that although the population has increased only
25%, the number of civil cases on the calendar in the county courts and law division of su-
perior court has increased 91%. There are increases reported as well in the county district
courts (65%), and in the number of criminal indictments filed (45%). The business of
the juvenile and domestic relations courts has increased in the same period by 252%.
47. See chart XV. In 1954-1955, 186 appeals were disposed of as contrasted with 139 in
the 1961-1962 term.
48. See chart XVII. The present New Jersey Supreme Court is of average productivity in
regard to sheer quantity of opinions written.
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selective, the court is assured of an adequate opportunity to hear, con-
sider, and decide every case that comes before it.49
One member of the judiciary committee, Professor Morris Schnitzer,
argued that an appeal as of right should be allowed where two courts
reach opposite conclusions in the same case.5" At this juncture it is
apropos to note that there is some merit to Professor Schnitzer's sugges-
tion. During the twenty-one month period reflected in chart fourteen,
the percentage of reversals by the supreme court of cases in which the
lower courts reached antipodal conclusions was 70 per cent, whereas in
other cases it was only 48 per cent."1 In those cases coming before the
court as of right because there was a dissent in the appellate division, the
percentage of reversals was only 20 per cent. If the rate of reversal is
any indication of significance, then reversal by the appellate division,
rather than a dissent, should be the ground for appeals as of right. But
39 per cent of the cases before the appellate division were reversed or
modified, whereas in only I per cent of the cases dissenting opinions were
filed. An appeal as of right in each case of reversal by the appellate di-
vision would inundate the supreme court.
PROPOSAL FOR THE SIMPLIFICATION OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION IN OHIO
The Ohio Supreme Court is compelled to decide cases of low signifi-
cance as a result of present Ohio appellate statutes. It disposes of these
cases effectively with memorandum dismissals and per curiam opinions.
But this task is esurient of precious time better devoted to the difficult,
troublesome cases where conflicting interests of a significant nature must
be resolved with the least possible friction. An exponentially increasing
population with a correlative increase in litigation, ultimately creates an
impossible situation for a state supreme court with such broad mandatory
appellate jurisdiction. Faced with inadequate appellate consideration of
the social, economic, and legal environment of a case, resulting in a
poor decision accompanied by a confusing and obscure opinion, the early
Georgia appellate structure might be preferred. 2
49. 2 STATE OF N. J. CONSTITTlONAL CONVENTION OF 1947 1183-84.
50. '"Where two courts reach opposite conclusions in the same case it seems to me that an
appeal as of right to the highest appellate authority is warranted. In practice, however, the
supreme court may tend to certify such cases more liberally than cases in which the lower
courts agreed upon the result." SCBNITZER, THE NEW PRACricE 335 (1949).
This principle is embodied in N.Y. CONsT. art. 6, § 3b(1). See also N.Y. CIVIL PRAc-
TIcE LAW § 5601 (Effective Sept. 1, 1963); FINAL REPOR.T OF THE ADVISORY COIMITIEE
ON PRAcricE AND PRocEDUR § 5601 (a), A-204 (1961), for an attempted modification.
51. The data collected in Ohio does not validate the New Jersey experience. See chart IV.
52. From 1776 to 1846 there was no appellate court in Georgia. For a fascinating exposi-
tion of this period see Lamar, A Unique and Unfamiliar Chapter in Our American Legal His-
tory, 10 A.B.A.J. 513 (1924).
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Last year the Ohio Supreme Court disposed of 232 cases, considered
319 motions to certify, and undoubtedly handled many other orders and
motions. Contrast this with the 139 cases and 125 petitions for certifica-
tion disposed of during the 1961-1962 term by the New Jersey Supreme
Court. This should indicate the need for change in Ohio.
Not too long ago Louisiana recognized a similar problem. The ju-
dicial council of Louisiana observed that: "During the 1955-56 term,
the Court wrote 349 opinions, disposing of 299 cases. It considered 157
applications for rehearing, and 257 applications for writs."5  Louisiana
not only recognized the problem but did something about it. In 1958
the volume of appeals in the Louisiana Supreme Court was reduced by
80 per cent."
In Pennsylvania a recent proposal reads:
The Supreme Court shall be the highest court of the commonwealth and
shall have final appellate jurisdiction. It shall have no original juris-
diction except as may be expressly provided in this Constitution. It may
assume jurisdiction of actions pending in any other court at any stage of
the proceedings. It shall have the power to issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Appeals from final judg-
ments of the Common Pleas Court shall lie as of right directly to the
Supreme Court only in cases of judgments imposing sentences of death
or life imprisonment. In all other cases, appeals permitted by law shall
53. Quoted in Tucker, Tate & McMahon, Appellate Reorganization in Louisiana, 19 LA. L.
R v. 287 (1959).
54. The court's appellate jurisdiction was reduced to:
"(1) Cases in which the constitutionality or legality of any tax, local improvement
assessment, toll or impost levied by the state or by any parish, municipality, board or subdivision
of the state is contested;
(2) Cases in which an ordinance of a parish, municipal corporation, board or subdi-
vision of the state, or a law of this state has been declared unconstitutional;
(3) Cases in which orders of the Public Service Commission are in contest, as is pro-
vided in Article VI, Section 5 of this Constitution;
(4) Appealable cases involving election contests, but only if the election district from
which the suit or contest arises does not lie wholly within a court of appeal circuit; and
(5) Criminal cases in which the penalty of death or imprisonment at hard labor may
be imposed, or in which a fine exceeding three hundred dollars or imprisonment exceeding
six months has been actually imposed." LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10 cited and discussed in
Tucker, Tate, & McMahon, sapra note 53, at 290.
The authors were encouraged by the revision, expressing optimism for the future of the
Louisiana judicial system. "Viewed in the persepective of long-range hopes of bench and bar
for further improvement of a judicial system which is basically sound, the adoption of the
appellate revision amendment signifies a number of things. It demonstrates the potentialities
of the Judicial Council as the coordinating force spear-heading a broad program of judicial
reform. It demonstrates the efficacy of enlightened and disinterested bar association leader-
ship at both the state and local levels. It signifies the tremendous influence of the office of
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, when exerted by an incumbent who is keenly interested in
the improvement of the administration of justice. Lastly, it demonstrates the fact that an ap-
peal for improvements in the administration of justice can be made successfully, both to the
legal profession and to an enlightened public opinion, when convincing proof of the need is
supported by accurate factual data, and the solution of the problem has been developed by
thorough discussion and the objective cooperation of all segments of the legal profession in
Louisiana." Tucker, Tate, & McMahon, supra note 53, at 293. For a recent appraisal see




be assigned by the Supreme Court to such court as the Supreme Court
shaU by Rule prescribe.55 (Emphasis added.)
On the basis of the statistical data in this general study several specif-
ic proposals for reform in the Ohio appellate system are manifest.
1. The mandatory appeal from the Board of Tax Appeals and the
Public Utilities Commission to the supreme court should be abolished.
This mandatory appeal in theory seems desirable because of the ostensible
general importance of tax and rate cases. However, empirically, this can-
not be substantiated. The statistical data indicates these cases are of low
significance and summarily disposed of by the high court. In both in-
stances, appeal should lie to the court of appeals. When cases of great
public importance arise the supreme court could grant a motion to certify.
2. The mandatory appellate jurisdiction in the area of constitution-
al law should be retained. However, some device, such as a short juris-
dictional statement, should be required to obviate the necessity of the
court perusing the record to ascertain whether the appeal is meritorious."6
3. An appeal as of right in capital cases should be permitted directly
from the trial court. Where a life hangs in the balance the ultimate de-
termination should rest with the high court.
4. In all other cases the supreme court should have full discretion
to determine which cases it will hear. 7
55. Project Constitution, 34 PA. BAR Ass'N. Q. 147, 186-87 (1963). The criticism levelled
at the present Pennsylvania judicial system could appropriately be applied to some other extant
state systems: "Our present judicial system in Pennsylvania suffers from a number of major
deficiencies: (1) Structural deficiencies in the organization of its courts; (2) An outmoded,
archaic minor court system; (3) Lack of efficient supervision and administration over the
non-judicial aspects of the business of the courts; (4) Inefficient use of the judicial person.
nel; (5) A system of selection of judges which has made them dependent on political
leaders for their appointment, election and continuance in office . ... " SCHUuLmAN, TowARD
JUDIcIAL RrFoRM iN PENNSYLVAIA (circa 1960) quoted in Project Constitution, supra
at 282.
56. Presently there is no such requirement. See Omo SUP. CT. R. H. On a motion to
certify the court does require: "A short statement of the case, showing how the questions arise,
and an argument on behalf of the appellant, which should be characterized by clarity and
conciseness and be supported by citation of authorities on which appellant relies." OHIo
SUP. CT. I VIII, § 3 (c).
But S 6 of Rule VIII provides: "Either party may file twelve copies of a printed or non-
printed brief upon the motion [to certify], which copies may thereafter be used as briefs upon
the merits of the case... should the motion to certify the record be granted."
This later provision casts doubt on the "brevity" of the statement referred to in § 3 (c).
This even though the court recently stated:
"If a party believes his cause to be one of public or great general interest, he may seek
leave of this court to hear his cause by filing with the clerk a motion to certify the record ....
It follows, of course, that the sole issue for determinaion at the hearing upon such motion is
whether the cause presents a question or questions of interest primarily to the parties. Whether
the question or questions argued are in fact ones of public or great general interest rests within
the discretion of the court. In the event this court determines that the cause presents a question
of that character, the motion to certify will be allowed, and the cause will be docketed for
a subsequent hearing on the merits." Williamson v. Rubich, 171 Ohio St. 253, 254, 168
N.E.2d 876, 877 (1960). Discussed in Comment, 30 U. CINc. L. REV. 383 (1961).
57. The standard of N. Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(b) (1), discussed in note 50 supra, is rejected
on the basis of the data reported herein. See discussion in text at 519 and charts IV and V.
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5. In addition, there should be authorization for certification on the
court's own motion, or on petition of a party, of cases after judgment of
the trial court or when pending in the court of appeals."s
A workable model is available for implementing these proposals.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has "new frontiered," providing impres-
sive evidence of the effective flexibility of its certification practice. It is
notable that Pennsylvania's recent proposals tend toward the New Jersey
position.
Aside from the fact that such a system has worked well in New Jer-
sey, it makes good sense intrinsically. Where there is an error committed
in the trial court, why is a multiple level appeal necessary? The court
of appeals can effectively handle trial court miscalculations. A reversal
by the intermediate appellate court will deter proliferation of error as
effectively as a reversal by the high court.
Where a case is of first impression, or a decision by the supreme court
will unify divergent views of the law, provide guidance to developing
areas of the law, or affect a substantial portion of the population, the
supreme court will undoubtedly grant a motion to certify and hear the
case. The permissive appeal procedure does not bar the proper case from
review by the supreme court, rather it bars those that are improper, free-
ing time for reflection, research, discussion, and legal precept building so
necessary for disposition of the proper cases.
58. Instead of granting a hearing on a motion to certify, the court might rely on the short
brief filed with the motion, thereby conserving precious time. Rather than requiring a majority
vote to allow the motion, the court might adopt a rule that a minority of three could grant a
motion to certify, thereby increasing the probability of a hearing in significant cases. Under
such a rule if three members of the court voted to allow the motion to certify the case would
be heard. On the "rule of four" in United States Supreme Court certiorari practice see
Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975 (1957).
Justice Frankfurter contends: "Even though a minority may bring a case here for oral
argument, that does not mean that the majority has given up its right to vote on the ultimate
disposition of the case as conscience directs. This is not a novel doctrine. As a matter of
practice, members of the Court have at various times exercised this right of refusing to pass
on the merits of cases that in their view should not have been granted review.
"This does not make the 'rule of four' a hollow rule. I would not change the practice.
No Justice is likely to vote to dismiss a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted after
argument has been heard, even though he has not been convinced that the case is within the
rules of the Court governing the granting of certiorari." Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R1, 352
U.S. 500, 528 (1957) Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Williamson v. Rubich, 171 Ohio St. 253, 168 N.E.2d 876 (1960), appears to depart
from the justice's prophecy.
Liaison between the chief justice and the presiding judges of each of the ten districts would
in effect also retain the advantage of the practice of certification by the appellate division. In-
deed, such an arrangement might be required for effective certification of cases on the court's
own motion. Unfortunately, there is a constitutional impediment to adoption of certification
before judgment in the court of appeals. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2 provides inter alia: "In
cases of public or great general importance the supreme court may ...direct any court of
appeals to certify its record to the supreme court, and may review, and affirm, modify or reverse
the judgment of the court of appeals." (Emphasis added.)
If the constitutional objection is not circumvented, retention of the certification practice
would be desirable. The judges of the court of appeals have used their power sparingly. The
cases so certified have been, for the most part, significant. See chart IV.
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Justice Cardozo long ago candidly admitted that courts do legislate,
even where statutes are involved. 9 And the "process, being legislative,
demands the legislator's wisdom."6  Each decision of import directs the
movement of our society. Too often the consequences of these decisions
are not thought out, the making of the decision being all important. The
how and why are equally weighty.
In any case, where the law to be applied is not dear a judge must
make
(1) the effort to diagnose the significant problem involved, and
(2) the effort to mark out the life-situation which gives rise to the
problem. Distinct from either is (3) the effort to determine an, or the
most appropriate, line of solution or treatment, and then (4) the
specific prescription which may be called for .... Only when there is
clarity at each step, in both line and reason does the resultant rule be-
come the dear working tool the [grand] style demands and labors to
produce.61
An effective modern appellate system cannot instill wisdom. How-
ever, it can provide more time to state supreme court judges to reach
appropriate decisions, accompanied by opinions that clarify and integrate
prior precedent and provide a guide for the solution of recurring situation-
types prospectively. Ohio, it is submitted, needs such a system.
59. For an irrefutable example of judicial legislation see James v. United States, 366 U.S.
213 (1961), a rare example of prospective overruling by the United States Supreme Court.
60. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDIcrAL PRocEss 115 (1921).
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tCitations are to the jurisdictional authorizations in the Ohio Constitution and the Re-
vised Code. Chapter citations indicate that the jurisdictional authorizations are pervasive
throughout the chapter.
$119.01. Definitions.
As used in sections 119.01 to 119.13, inclusive, of the Revised Code: (A) "Agency"
means, except as limited by this division, any official, board, or commission having
authority to promulgate rules or make adjudications in the bureau of unemployment
compensation, the civil service commission, the department of industrial relations, the
department of liquor control, the department of taxation, the industrial commission, the
functions of any administrative or executive officer, department, division, bureau, board,
or commission of the government of the state specifically made subject to sections
119.01 to 119.13, inclusive, of the Revised Code, and the licensing functions of any
administrative or executive officer, department, division, bureau, board, or commission
of the government of the state having the authority or responsibility of issuing, suspend-
ing, revoking, or canceling licenses. Sections 119.01 to 119.13, inclusive, of the Revised
Code do not apply to the public utilities commission, nor do they apply to actions of
the superintendent of banks, the superintendent of building and loan associations, and
the superintendent of insurance in the taking possession of, and rehabilitation or liqui-
dation of, the business and property of banks, building and loan associations, insurance
companies, associations, reciprocal fraternal benefit societies, and bond investment com-
panies, nor to any action that may be taken by the superintendent of banks under sec-
tions 1111.12, 1113.02, and 1113.14 of the Revised Code. Sections 119.01 to 119.13,
inclusive, of the Revised Code do not apply to actions of the industrial commission un-
der sections 4123.01 to 4123.94, inclusive, of the Revised Code. Sections 119.01 to
119.13, inclusive, of the Revised Code do not apply to actions of the bureau of unem-
ployment compensation except those relating to the adoption, amendment, or rescission
of rules, and those relating to the issuance, suspension, revocation, or cancellation of
licenses.
*Various types of review are included under the rubric "Appeal on questions of law
and fact." For example, the supreme court is authorized to reverse, vacate, or modify
"unreasonable or unlawful" orders or decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals and Public
Utilities Commission. An appeal to the court of common pleas from the Industrial
Commission, involving a claim for compensation, is to proceed "in accordance with
the rules of civil procedure" and is essentially a trial de novo. See SKEEL, OHIO AP-
PELLATE MANUAL §§ 33, 75 (1958). Both types of review are denominated "law and
fact" in Chart I for the sake of simplicity. Chart I is only a simplified graphic repre-
sentation of the general appellate structure in Ohio.
CHART 11
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURTS IN OHIO
§ 1. In whom judicial power vested.
The judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals,
courts of common pleas, courts of probate, and such other courts inferior to the courts
of appeals as may from time to time be established by law.
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 1.
§ 22. Supreme court commission.
A commission, which shall consist of five members, shall be appointed by the gov-
ernor, with the advice and consent of the senate, the members of which shall hold
office for the term of three years from and after the first day of February, 1876, to
dispose of such part of the business then on the dockets of the supreme court, as
shall, by arrangement between said commission and said court, be transferred to such
commission; and said commission shall have like jurisdiction and power in respect to
such business as are or may be vested in said court; and the members of said commission
shall receive a like compensation for the time being, with the judges of said court. A
majority of the members of said commission shall be necessary to form a quorum
or pronounce a decision, and its decision shall be certified, entered, and enforced as the
judgments of the supreme court, and at the expiration of the term of said commission,
all business undisposed of shall by it be certified to the supreme court and disposed
of as if said commission had never existed. . . The general assembly may, on ap-
plication of the supreme court duly entered on the journal of the court and certified,
provide by law, whenever two-thirds of such (each) house shall concur therein, from
time to time, for the appointment, in like manner, of a like commission with like
powers, jurisdiction and duties; provided, that the term of any such commission shall
not exceed two years, nor shall it be created oftener than once in ten years.
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 22.
§ 18. Powers and jurisdiction.
The several judges of the supreme court, of the common pleas, and of such other
courts as may be created, shall, respectively, have and exercise such power and juris-
diction, at chambers, or otherwise, as may be directed by law.
OHIO CoNsT. art. IV, § 18.
JURISDICTION OF THE OHIO SUPREME COURT
CONSTITUTION IMPLEMENTING STATUTES
§ 2. The supreme court.
It shall have original jurisdiction in § 2731.02. Courts authorized to issue
quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, writ; contents.
prohibition and procedendo,
The writ of mandamus may be allowed
by the supreme court, the court of ap-
peals, or the court of common pleas and
shall be issued by the derk of the court
in which the application is made. Such
writ may issue on the information of the
party beneficially interested.
Such writ shall contain a copy of the




and appellate jurisdiction in all cases in-
volving questions arising under the con-
stitution of the United States or of this
state,
in cases of felony on leave first obtained,
IMPLEMENTING STATUTES
§ 2505.28. Appeal on questions of law
to supreme court.
A judgment rendered or a final order
made by a court of appeals or a judge
thereof, court of common pleas or a judge
thereof, or probate court may be re-
versed, vacated, or modified by the su-
preme court by an appeal on questions
of law, except cases in which the judg-
ment of the court of appeals is final, as
provided by Section 6 of Article IV,
Ohio Constitution, and such judgment
shall not be subject to modification, va-
cation, or reversal.
§ 2505.29. No appeal filed without
leave of supreme court; exceptions.
No appeal shall be filed in the su-
preme court unless such court or a judge
thereof grants leave to file such an ap-
peal. Such leave need not be obtained
to file an appeal as to the judgment or
final order of the court of appeals, or a
judge thereof, in cases involving ques-
tions under the constitution of the United
States, or of this state, in cases which
originated in the court of appeals, and
as to proceedings of administrative offi-
cers as may be provided by law.
§ 2953.02. Review of judgments.
In a criminal case, including a con-
viction for the violation of an ordinance
of a municipal corporation, the judgment
or final order of a court or magistrate
inferior to the court of common pleas,
may be reviewed in the court of common
pleas, and a judgment or final order of a
court of record or officer inferior to the
court of appeals may be reviewed in the
court of appeals. A judgment or final
order of the court of appeals involving a
question arising under the Constitution
of the United States or of this state may
be appealed to the supreme court as a
matter of right.
Such right of appeal shall extend to
felony cases in which the supreme court
has directed the court of appeals to cer-
tify its record
and in cases which originated in the
courts of appeals, and such revisory juris-
diction of the proceedings of administra-




In cases of public or great general
interest the supreme court may, within
such limitations of time as may be pre-
scribed by law, direct any court of ap-
peals to certify its record to the supreme
court, and may review, and affirm,
modify or reverse the judgment of the
court of appeals ....
Orno CONST. art. IV, § 2.
IMPLEMENTING STATUTES
and in all other criminal cases of public
or great general interest wherein the su-
preme court has granted a motion to
certify the record of the court of ap-
peals....
JURISDICTION OF THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
§ 6. The appellate courts.
§6. The appellate courts.
The courts of appeals shall have original
jurisdiction in quo warranto, mandamus,
habeas corpus, prohibition and proced-
endo,
and such jurisdiction as may be provided
by law to review, affirm, modify, set
aside, or reverse judgments or final orders
of boards, commissions, officers, or tri-
bunals, and of courts of record inferior
to the court of appeals within the district,
IMPLEMENTING STATUTES
See OHIO REV. CODE § 2731.02.
§ 2505.27. Appeal on questions of law
to court of appeals.
A judgment or final order made by
a court of common pleas, a probate court,
or by any other court of record, or by a
judge of any such courts, may be re-
versed, vacated, or modified for errors
appearing on the record, upon an appeal
on questions of law, by the court of ap-
peals having jurisdiction in the county
wherein such court of record is located.
Appeals in Criminal Cases.
See OHIO REV. CODE § 2953.02.
and judgments of the courts of appeals
shall be final in all cases, except cases in-
volving questions arising under the con-
stitution of the United States or of this
state, cases of felony, cases of which it
has original jurisdiction, and cases of
public or great general interest in which
the supreme court may direct any court
of appeals to certify its record to the
court . . . . [W]henever the judges of
a court of appeals find that a judgment
upon which they have agreed is in con-
flict with a judgment pronounced upon
the same question by any other court of
appeals of the state, the judges shall
certify the record of the case to the su-
preme court for review and final de-
termination. ...
OHIo CONST. art IV, § 6.
CHART II (continued)
JURISDICTION OF THE OHIO COMMON PLEAS COURT
CONSTITUTION
§ 4. Their jurisdiction. (Common Pleas)
The jurisdiction of the courts of com-
mon pleas, and of the judges thereof,
shall be fixed by law.
OHIo CONST. art. IV, § 4.
IMPLEMENTING STATUTES
See OHiO REv. CODB § 2731.02.
§ 2305.01. Jurisdiction in civil cases;
trial transfer.
The court of common pleas has original
jurisdiction in all civil cases where the
sum or matter in dispute exceeds the ex-
clusive original jurisdiction of county
courts; and appellate jurisdiction from
the decisions of boards of county com-
missioners, county courts, and other in-
ferior courts in the proper county, in all
civil cases, subject to the regulations pro-
vided by law.
The court of common pleas may on its
own motion transfer for trial any action
in said court to any municipal court in
the county having concurrent jurisdiction
of the subject matter of, and the parties
to, the action, if the amount sought by
the plaintiff does not exceed one thou-
sand dollars and if the judge, presiding
judge, or chief justice of such municipal
court concurs in the proposed transfer.
Upon the issuance of an order of trans-
fer, the clerk of courts shall remove to
the designated municipal court the entire
case file. Any untaxed portion of the
common pleas deposit for court costs
shall be remitted to the municipal court
by the clerk of courts to be applied in
accordance with section 1901.26 of the
Revised Code; and the costs taxed by the
municipal court shall be added to any
costs taxed in the common pleas court.
§ 2505.24. Appeal on questions of law
to court of common pleas.
A judgment rendered or final order
made by a judge of a county court or
any other tribunal, board, or officer, exer-
cising judicial functions, and inferior to
the court of common pleas, may be re-
versed, vacated, or modified by the court
of common pleas upon an appeal on
questions of law.
CHART III
APPELLATE PROCEDURE FOR REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF COURTS AND AGENCIES IN
STATUTORY REVIEWING COURT
COURT or AGENCY AUTHORIZATION QUESTIONS ON REVIEW or AGENCY
Probate Court § 2101.42 Law; Law & Fact Court of Appeals
Juvenile Court § 2151.52 Law Court of Appeals
Municipal Court § 1901.30 Law; Law & Fact Court of Appeals &
Common Pleas
Mayor's Court § 1905.22 Law Common Pleas
County Court ch. 1921 Trial De Novo Common Pleas

































Common Pleas Franklin C
Common Pleas &




Bd. of Tax Appeals













Xds § 2506.01 Trial De Novo on Record Common Pleas
§ 2506.03 N.B. exceptions § 2506.03
Other sections of the OFHO REV. CODE, including §§ 2709.36, 3515.15, and 4123.06 provide
for a direct appeal to the supreme court in certain circumstances. However, because of the infre-
quent use of such sections they are omitted from this analysis.
Local Boa
CHART IV
REVIEW OF CASES FROM THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS 1962 TERM
Tribunal Antecedent Disposition in Supreme Court No. Cases No. Cases No. Caw
to Cowith with Decideur  of Appeals Affirmed Reversed Dismissed Dissenting Dissenting Per Curi
or Modified Opinions Votes or Memoran
Dispositi
None (originated in
the Court of Appeals) 10 5 5 1 14
n Common Pleas 11 6 44 3 1 53
Probate Court 1 5 1 5
Municipal Court 2 1 6 1 1 7
Board of Tax Appeals 1 1
TOTAL 24 12 61 6 2 80
Common Pleas 5 16 2 1 2
Probate Court 3 5 1 1
i Municipal Court 1 3 2
Board of Tax Appeals 1 1
TOTAL 9 25 2 2 6
tifi-
:ion Common Pleas 5 4 4 2
TOTAL 38 41 61 8 8 88
Disposition by Supreme Court of Cases
Where Court of Appeals Reversed or
Modified Decision of Antecedent Tribunal.
High Affirmed Reversed Dismissed
or Modified
Disposition by Supreme Court of
Where Court of Appeals Affirme












































REVIEW OF CASES FROM THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 1962 TERM


















Disposition by Supreme Court of Cases Disposition by Supreme Court of C
Where Court of Appeals Reversed or Where Court of Appeals Affirmed
Significance Modified Decision of Antecedent Tribunal cision of Antecedent Tribunal.







TYPE OF CASES AND DISPOSITION 1962 TERM
LOW SIGNIFICANCE
MEMORANDUM or PER
ORIGIN DISPOSITION CURIAM DISPOSITIONS
Motion to Certifi-
























1 3 1 1
1 1
4 4 5 1 4
1 1 1 1 3
2
2


































TYPE OF CASES AND DISPOSITION 1962 TERM
MODERATE SIGNIFICANCE
MEMORANDUM or PER
ORIGIN DISPOSITION CURIAM DISPOSITIONS
Motion to Certifi-
Type of Case Appeal Certify cation Affirmed Reversed Dismissed Affirmed Reversed Dismissed Total
Administrative Law 1 1 1
Civil Procedure 1 1 1







Election Law 1 1 1
Eminent Domain 1 1
Evidence 1 1 2
Habeas Corpus 2 1 1 2
Insurance 2 2
Labor Law 2 2 2
,Licensing 1 1
Mandamus 1 1






Taxation 6 1 1 2 2 3 1 8
Torts 3 1 2 3









TOTAL 18 15 2 9 14 4 3 5 35
CHART VII (continued)
OHIO SUPREME COURT
TYPE OF CASES AND DISPOSITION 1962 TERM
HIGH SIGNIFICANCE
MEMORANDUM or PER
ORIGIN DISPOSITION CURIAM DISPOSITIONS
Motion to Certifi-
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CHART IX






Average Dissenting Total with
Length Opinions Length Opinion


















































*Judges of the court of appeals temporarily assigned to sit as supreme court judges
pursuant to OHIo CoNST. art. IV, § 2.
21.00
Dissenting Dissent Concurring Concurring Concurring in Concurring in
Total in Part Total without in in the Dissenting in Concurring
Length Opinions Length Opinion Dissenting Judgment Part Opinions Opinions
Opinion But Not
the Opinion
.25 7 1 2 1
.25 2 1
8.00 1 2.00 7 5 2
4
4.50 6 1 1
2
3 7.50 8 3 1 2
1 .50
10.00 36 5 913.00 5 2 8
CHART X
OHIO SUPREME COURT ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Prerogative Writs
FULL WRITTEN MEMORANDUM or PER
OPINION CURIAM DISPOSITION
SIGNIFICANCE SIGNIFICANCE
LOW MODERATE HIGH LOW MODERATE HIGH
3 1 3 8 3 2
TOTAL
20
























NEW JERSEY JUDICIAL SYSTEM - 1960
SUPREME COURT
Chief Justice and 6 Associates.
Initial Term of 7 years with tenure on reap-
pointment and mandatory retirement at 70.
Final appeal in:
1. Constitutional questions.
2. Where dissent in Appellate Division.
3. Capital causes.
4. Certifications.
5. In such causes as provided by law.
SUPERIOR COURT
44 Judges. Term, tenure, and retirement
same as Supreme Court.
LAW DIVISION
1. General jurisdiction in all
causes, civil and criminal.
2. Proceedings in lieu of
prerogative writs, except




1. Law and Chancery Divisions.
2. County Courts.
3. County District Courts.
4. Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts.
5. State Administrative Agencies.






69 Judges authorized, 1 to 8 per county. Term: 5 years.
1. LAW DIVISION: General jurisdiction, civil and criminal within county.
Hears appeals from municipal courts and Division of Workmen's
Compensation.
2. PROBATE DIVISION: Contested probate matters.







































ANALYSIS OF APPEALS DECIDED BY THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
June 6, 1960- February 26, 1962
Disposition
Affirmed











% of Total Volume
% of Cases with Dissent-
ing Opinions
% of Cases with Dissent-
ing Votes
% Reversed
IMANDATORY APPEALS I PERMISSIVE APPEALS
Class Class Css Ca Class Class Class Class
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3 8 1 44 2 6 5
1 3 2 1
1 1 6 1 3 6
1 3 1 16 2 10 3
2 1 1
10 3 6 11 1 5 5

















Class 1-Original jurisdiction - disciplinary proceedings.
Class 2-Dissent in Appellate Division.
Class 3-Capital cases.
Class 4--Other.
Class 5--Certification court's own motion before hearing in Appellate Division.
Class 6-Certification party's own motion before hearing in Appellate Division.
Class 7--Certification party's own motion after hearing in Appellate Division where Appellate Di-
vision affirmed court below.
Class 8--Certification party's own motion after hearing in Appellate Division where Appellate Di-
vision reversed court below.
CHART XV
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
APPEALS CLASSIFIED JUkISDICTIONALLY*












































*Statistics for 1950-1955 from Stoffer, The Work of the JudicU System: 1954-1955, 10 RuTGERS












NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT 1960-1961 TERM















































TRIBUNAL BELOW FOR APPEALS DECIDED
Superior Court, Appellate Division
Superior Court, Law Division
Superior Court, Chancery Division
County Court
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
State Agencies:
Division of Tax Appeals
Department of Public Utilites
Office of Milk Industry
Department of Labor and Industry
Department of Education




Source: REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS (1961).
CHART XVII
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
OPINIONS OF THE JUSTICES PUBLISHED DURING 1960-1961 TERM
Majority* Disssenting Dissent Concurring Concurring Total
Opinions Opinions without with without Opinions
Opinion Opinion Opinion Written
WEINTRAUB 15 1 2 17
JACOBS 13 1 1 14
FRANCIS 15 2 17
PROCTOR 15 2 1 17
HALL 7 3 7 3 10
SCHEITINO 11 1 5 12
HANEMAN 9 1 4 10
TOTAL 85 10 18 2 4 97
Opinions
per Justice 12 14
Per Curiam
Opinions 44





*An opinion by the late Justice Burling is omitted from these statistics.
CHART XVllI
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
GROUNDS FOR CERTIFICATION, N. J. REv. RULE 1:10-2*
Grounds Granted Denied Percentage
Denied
1. Where the Appellate Division has decided a ques-
tion of substance not theretofore determined by a court
of last resort of this State, or has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with applicable decisions of such
court.
2. Where the decision under review is in conflict with
any other decision of the Appellate Division.
3. Where the judges of the Appellate Division concur
in result, but are unable to agree upon a common
ground of decision.
4. Where the Appellate Division has decided an im-
portant question of law which has not been, but should
be settled by this court; or has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or
so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower tribunal
as to call for an exercise of this court's supervision.
5. Where the Appellate Division has decided a ques-
tion of substance relating to the construction or applica-
tion of a statute of this State, which has not been, but
should be settled by this court.
6. Injustice.








1. One petition also urged No. 2, another No. 4.
2. Three petitions also urged No. 6, one petition No. 4, one petition No. 5, and one petition No. 1,
No. 2, and No. 4.
3. Two petitions also urged No. 1, one petition No. 6.
4. One petition also urged No. 1, another No. 5.
5. One petition also urged No. 4, another No. 1.
6. One petition also urged No. 2, one petition No. 4, and one petition No. 1, No. 2, and No. 4.
*Statistics based on representative sample of sixty-two 1961-1962 petitions for certification.
CHART XIX
OHIO SUPREME COURT
DISPOSITION OF MOTIONS TO CERTIFY*
YEAR 1957 1958 1959 1960
Motions to Certify Denied
Motions to Certify Granted
Percentage Denied
TOTAL
70 89 76 63
76.4% 73.6% 78% 80.7%
293 341 346 319
*Source: Judicial Statistics, FOURTEENTH REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF OHIO 27 (1959);
Judicial Statistics, FIFTEENTH REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF OHIO 31 (1961).
